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I. INTRODUCTION
There is likely no area of employment law more ancient than the law of
post-employment competition. The so-called “rule of reason” that
undergirds contemporary noncompete doctrine dates to the early 1700s,1 and


Visiting Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Chauncy Wilson Memorial
Research Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law; L.L.M., Temple Law
School; J.D. Harvard Law School; B.A. Rutgers University. Thank you to colleagues Alan
Hyde, Orly Lobel, Evan Starr, Daniel Sokol, and Steven Wilborn for valuable feedback and
Denver Law students Jessica Chao, Kellie Jenkins, and Becca Voorhees for outstanding
research assistance. Inspiration and ideas for this article came in part from the 2019
Conference on the Changing Nature of Work and Workplaces at Syracuse University,
Whitman School of Management. Thank you to the organizers and all presenters and
participants. All errors are my own.
1
See Mitchell v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). The first recorded instances
of the use of employee noncompetition agreements date to the fifteenth and sixteenth century,
at which time they were considered per se void as against public policy. See Harlan M. Blake,
Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631–32 (1960) (summarizing
early history of noncompete law); Mark A. Glick et al., The Law and Economics of Covenants:
A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 360–68 (2002) (same). By contrast the
rule of employment at will—the enduring, if controversial, presumption of the parties’ right
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until recently it has been relatively stagnant.2 At the dawn of the millennium,
the law of noncompetes appeared largely as it did in the 18th century: almost
every state, with the notable exception of California,3 permitted validly
formed noncompetes, provided they were tied to a protectible business
interest of the employer and reasonable in scope.4
But times are changing. In the last decade, there has been a surge in
public initiatives targeting employers’ use and enforcement of restraints
against employee competition—what I refer to as the “new enforcement
regime.” These have come at all levels of government and in a variety of

to freely terminate their relationship that undergirds all of American employment law—came
into being a full century and a half later. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.118, 125–29 (1976) (providing an historical
context and critical perspective on the rise of employment at will doctrine).
2
By way of comparison, the near two centuries that have elapsed since the formal
articulation of the at-will rule have witnessed a series of pendulum swings in which the courts
and legislatures have alternately deferred to and dialed back on employers’ right to terminate
workers at their discretion. This phenomenon is often described as a movement between
contract and status, the former embracing freedom of contract principles and deferring to the
private “choices” of the parties with respect to the terms of employment, and the latter
deeming employment a state-sanctioned status relationship subject to publicly imposed limits
and protections. For a discussion of these concepts, see Rachel S. Arnow-Richman,
Employment as Transaction, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 447, 468–69 (2009); Jay M. Feinman,
The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 124–25 (1976).
3
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–16602.5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of
2020 Reg. Sess.). For historical background on California’s peculiar law, which dates to the
late 1800s, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575,
614–19 (1999). Two other states have near identical statutory bans dating to the same period:
North Dakota and Oklahoma. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-06 (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective Jan. 1, 2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (West, Westlaw through
First Regular Session of the 57th Legislature (2019)). North Dakota has consistently banned
the use of noncompetes, but has received little to no scholarly attention, likely owing to the
modest size of its economy. By contrast, for decades courts in Oklahoma construed that
state’s statute as permitting restraints deemed reasonable at common law despite its plain
language. See Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. of America, 465 P.2d 448
(Okla. 1970). Recently, a combination of statutory amendments and judicial decisions
effectively restored the original meaning of the statute, making Oklahoma the third state to
ban noncompetes and the first to do since the emergence of the new enforcement regime. See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A (West, Westlaw through First Regular Session of the 57th
Legislature (2019)); see generally Teresa L. Green, The Shifting Landscape of Restrictive
Covenants in Oklahoma, 40 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 449 (2015); infra Part II.B.2.
4
See, e.g., WI. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (2020); TEX. BUS & COM. CODE § 15.50 (2020);
Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396–97 (Ill. 2011) (holding that a
noncompete is reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for a legitimate business
interest; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee; and (3) is not injurious to the
public); Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 576–77 (Mass. 2004) (holding
that a noncompete is enforceable “only if it is necessary to protect a legitimate business
interest, reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant with the public interest”); see
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981); infra Part II.A.
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forms, including new legislation, regulatory initiatives, targeted litigation,
and enforcement programs.5 With some exceptions, their aim is to restrict
employers’ already limited ability to prevent post-employment competition,6
a move consistent with a growing body of academic literature asserting that
such restraints against competition are harmful to employees and the
economy.7
It is therefore a fitting moment to reexamine the law and scholarship of
employee competition. It is also a fitting time to reconsider the work of one
particular scholar whose contributions to the employment law field are
abundant and diverse.8 Professor Charles Sullivan, over the course of a
prolific forty-year career, periodically waded into the “vast sea” of
5

See infra Part II.
For instance, a number of states have passed legislation categorically prohibiting the
use of noncompetes against workers earning below a threshold income. See, e.g., 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 90/10 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-629); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
26 § 599-A (West, Westlaw through Chapter 560 of the 2019 Second Regular Session of the
129th Legislature); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-716 (West, Westlaw through all
legislation from the 2019 Regular Session of the General Assembly); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 275:70-a (West, Westlaw through Chapter 4 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.). These and additional
limitations will be discussed infra Part II.
7
A fair amount of legal scholarship, including Sullivan’s, has argued for more limited
enforcement of noncompetes based on the risk of employer overreach leading to inefficient
and/or unfair results between the individual employer and employee. See, e.g., Rachel S.
Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the
Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163
(2001) [hereinafter Bargaining for Loyalty]; Blake, supra note 1; Cynthia Estlund, Between
Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form
of Employment Law, 155 PENN. L. REV. 2 (2006); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work:
Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 721 (2002); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of
the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001)
Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO
STATE L.J. 1127 (2009) [hereinafter Puzzling Persistence]. A second research stream in legal
scholarship has focused on the economic benefits of employee mobility and the adverse
effects of human capital controls on the overall economy. See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING
IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET
(2003); ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS,
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013); Gilson, supra note 3, at 577–80. As will be discussed, a
robust body of research in the fields of economics and business now provides empirical
support for these critiques. See infra Part II.
8
Professor Sullivan is known perhaps principally for his extensive work in
antidiscrimination law. For recent examples, see, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying
Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011); Charles A.
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 191 (2009). However, Professor Sullivan has written on diverse topics ranging from
artificial intelligence, see Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395 (2018), to
asterisk footnotes, see Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk Footnote, 93 GEO.
L. J. 1093 (2005).
6
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employee-competition law.9 Of particular note are two Articles—one
penned in the late 1970s,10 the other, over thirty years later11—that are not
only relevant to the current conversation, but eerily prescient.12 In them, he
articulates two risks of the unfettered use of noncompetes: the likelihood that
employers will impose illegally broad restraints on unassuming employees;13
and the possibility that even modestly drafted noncompetes, taken in the
aggregate, will adversely affect economic competition.14 Both suppositions
have since been borne out by emerging empirical data that is playing an
important role in noncompete reform efforts.15
This Article offers a 2020 perspective on a decade of on-the-ground
reform efforts and ground-breaking empirical research.
The new
enforcement regime appears to be heeding the calls of an emerging literature
that is toppling fundamental assumptions about the use of noncompetes and
the effectiveness of court-imposed limits on their enforcement. My claim,
however, is that it does not go far enough in deterring employer overreach in
drafting and requesting noncompetes. While the new regime will likely
succeed in reigning in particular employer abuses—by imposing, for
instance, what I will refer to as “vulnerable worker bans”—more aggressive
reforms are needed to protect the mobility of all employees and to realize the
economic benefits of a so-called “high velocity” labor market.16
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II surveys the historical and
emerging law of employee noncompetition. It describes a budding
enforcement regime with the potential to upend basic enforcement rules and
status quo employer practices. Part III considers both the impetus and
justification for these policy developments, connecting Professor Sullivan’s
9

See Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Clev. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio 1952)
(describing the common law of noncompete enforcement as “a sea—vast and vacillating,
overlapping and bewildering” out of which “[o]ne can fish . . . any kind of strange support for
anything”).
10
Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the “Neglected Stepchild”: Antitrust Treatment of
Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621 (1977) [hereinafter Neglected
Stepchild].
11
The Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7.
12
Nor are these Sullivan’s sole contributions to this field. Also relevant are his works
on “garden leave,” or pay-to-sit-out clauses, and employee loyalty. See Charles A. Sullivan,
Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition via “Garden Leave”, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 293 (2016) [hereinafter Tending the Garden]; Charles A Sullivan, Mastering the
Faithless Servant: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 777 (2011). For purposes of this paper, I limit my discussion to the other two.
13
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1150–51.
14
Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 637.
15
See infra Part III
16
ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).
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past work to a wave of empirical scholarship that seemingly validates longheld fears about the adverse economic effects of noncompete agreements and
the law’s inability to police opportunistic employer behavior. Part IV
speculates on what the new enforcement regime means for employee
mobility. It argues that in order for the new enforcement regime to
meaningfully alter current practices, state legislation must go further in three
ways. New laws must (1) ensure that workers receive initial notice of and
maintain ongoing access to information about their rights; (2) categorically
void agreements that reflect employer overreach, and (3) create pathways for
employees to challenge and remedy unlawful noncompete practices at all
stages of employment.
II. NONCOMPETITION LAW, THEN AND NOW
The regulation of employee mobility is a delicate matter. On one hand,
the law must protect employers’ investments in both information and human
capital in order to incentivize research and development.17 At the same time,
the law cannot allow employers to stymie fair competition or to impede the
free mobility of labor.18 At the cross-section of these competing policies is
the question of the contractual enforceability of noncompete agreements that
limit employees’ prospects for future employment. This section examines
noncompete law historically and from the vantage point of today, describing
a viral reform movement that, over the last five years, has sought to ban
noncompetes in particular populations and limit their use in the labor market
overall. This movement is giving way to a new enforcement regime far less
hospitable to noncompetes among states that have long condoned their use.
A. The Predictably Unpredictable Common Law
Compared to other restrictive covenants, noncompetes are of particular
concern because they impose outright limits on employees’ ability to engage
in competitive work.19 They have the potential to profoundly impede
17
See generally Blake, supra note 1, at 627 (“From the point of view of the employer,
postemployment restraints are regarded as perhaps the only effective method of preventing
unscrupulous competitors or employees from appropriating valuable trade information and
customer relationships for their own benefit.”). Professor Harlan Blake’s seminal article,
although written sixty years ago, still serves as an eloquent and insightful exposition of the
competing policies underlying noncompete law, and I rely on it throughout this section and
the Article.
18
See id. (“[Postemployment] restraints also diminish competition by intimidating
potential competitors and by slowing down the dissemination of ideas, processes, and
methods. They unfairly weaken the individual employee’s bargaining position vis-à-vis his
employer and, from the social point of view, clog the market’s channeling of manpower to
employments in which its productivity is greatest.”).
19
Other contractual instruments like non-solicitation and non-disclosure agreements, by
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individual workers’ access to economic opportunity, effectively indenturing
them to a particular employer. Thus, noncompetes pose an especially high
risk of economic harm to the individual employees who sign them, as well
as the broader harms to society that flow from any private agreement in
restraint of trade.
The law has historically attempted to contain both risks by imposing a
two-part “rule of reason.”20 In every state that permits noncompetes,
employers must first justify their use of the instrument by demonstrating an
interest at stake beyond the mere desire to avoid ordinary competition or
retain the individual employee.21 The way that interest is defined varies
somewhat across states, but generally the law requires that the employee
have access either to trade secrets, confidential information, or customer

contrast, impose much narrower restraints on employees. The former prohibit employees
from contacting co-workers or past clients; the latter from disclosing or relying on proprietary
information. The fact that contractual vehicles for protecting employer interests exist short
of an outright restraint on employee competition casts further doubt on the justifications for
allowing noncompetes given their harsh effects on employees. New legislation in
Massachusetts recognizes this point, making the potential effectiveness of less onerous
restraints a consideration in determining the reasonableness of a noncompete. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 24L(b)(iii) (West 2020) (“A noncompetition agreement may be
presumed necessary where the legitimate business interest cannot be adequately protected
through an alternative restrictive covenant, including but not limited to a non-solicitation
agreement or a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement.”). For the most part, however,
states have categorized all restrictive covenants imposed on employees as subject to the basic
rule of reason developed in the noncompete context. See, e.g,W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn
Div. v. Mouyal, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (Ga. 1999) (“[A nonsolicitation agreement] contained
in an employment contract is considered to be in partial restraint of trade and will be upheld
if the restrain imposed is not unreasonable . .”); Aon Consulting, Inc. v. Midlands Fin.
Benefits, Inc., 748 N.W.2d 626, 653 (Neb. 2008) (determining the enforceability of a
nonsolicitation agreement by considering whether the restriction is “(1) reasonable in the
sense that it is not injurious to the public, (2) not greater than is reasonably necessary to protect
the employer in some legitimate interest, and (3) not unduly harsh and oppressive on the
employee.”); Cambridge Eng’g, Inc. v. Mercury Partners 90 BI, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 512, 528
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“A nonsolicitation clause is only valid if reasonably related to the
employer’s interest in protecting customer relations that its employees developed while
working for the employer.”) (internal quotations omitted).
20
I have described the applicable legal framework in more detail elsewhere, as have
others. See generally Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1173−80 (2001); Estlund, supra
note 7, at 393-95; Glick, supra note 1, at 370–73. For purposes of this Article, therefore, I
offer a brief summary, relying on these and other sources.
21
See, e.g., Davis v. Albany Area Primary Health Care, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 909, 912 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998) (declaring that “avoidance of competition is not a legitimate business interest”
in finding geographically broad physician noncompete unenforceable); Hasty v. Rent-ADriver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1984) (“[A]ny competition by a former employee
may well injure the business of the employer. An employer, however, cannot by contract
restrain ordinary competition.”); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996) (“[I]t is well
settled that only a legitimate business interest may be protected by a noncompetition covenant.
If the sole purpose is to avoid ordinary competition, it is unreasonable and unenforceable.”).
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relationships.22 Once the employer meets this threshold showing, it must
additionally demonstrate that the scope of the restraint is reasonable in
relation to those interests and not unduly harmful to the employee.23
This body of common law has long had a statutory overlay. Over the
course of the twentieth century about half the states enacted some form of
noncompete legislation. For the most part, however, those statutes did not
substantially change the underlying law. Some targeted specific professions,
such as physicians or radio broadcasters.24 Others made particular tweaks,
such as expanding or more precisely delineating the circumstances under
which an employer could meet the threshold requirement of an underlying
interest.25 Yet, for the most part, these statutes reaffirmed the two-part rule
of reason. Some codified it outright.26 Others took a seemingly more
comprehensive or idiosyncratic approach, only to later be interpreted by
court decisions reasserting the relevance of the historical rule.27 In the end,
22

See Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1176.
See Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1178; Glick, supra note
1, at 371–73. Some articulations of the rule also reference potential harm to the public, see
generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981) (declaring noncompete
unenforceable where “the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and
the likely injury to the public”), but as discussed, infra, courts generally omit any direct
application of that portion of the rule. See infra Part III.A.
24
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14p (West 2020); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 17/10
(2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 186 (2018); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 202-k (McKinney 2018);
5 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37-33 (West 2020); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West
2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (West 2020).
25
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(b)(5) (2020) (recognizing “extraordinary or
specialized training” as a basis for enforcing a noncompete); ALA. CODE § 8-1-191 (2020)
(recognizing “[s]pecialized and unique training involving substantial business expenditure”
as a protectable business interest justifying enforcement of restrictive covenants); cf. C.R.S.A.
§8-2-113(2)(c) (2019) (sanctioning the use of training repayment contracts with employees
who depart within two years of employment).
26
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 44-2701 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (2018); WIS.
STAT. § 103.465 (2018).
27
As an extreme example, in the 1980s, courts in Oklahoma ruled that the state’s
century-old noncompete statute, which on its face declared all restraints of trade void, applied
only to agreements deemed unreasonable at common law. See infra, Part II.B.2; see also
Technicolor Inc. v Traeger, 551 P. 2d 163, 170 (Haw. 1976) (finding that Hawaii statute
seemingly limiting lawful employee noncompetes to the protection of trade secrets “was not
meant to be exclusive” permitting a court to analyze “all restrictive convenants. . . not listed
as ‘per se violations’ and determine their validity” under the rule of reason). A more subtle
example is Colorado. That state’s statute, confines enforceable restraints of trade to situations
involving trade secrets or “managerial and executive” employees. C.R.S.A. §8-2-113 (2019).
Yet some cases read the statutory exceptions in ways that arguably expand the bases for a
noncompete to be more in accordance with traditional common law. For instance, while the
Colorado statute does not create an exception for agreements protecting customer goodwill,
courts have read the trade secret provision to permit noncompetes that effectively serve that
purpose. See, e.g., Great Am. Opportunities, Inc. v. Kent, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1134–35(D.
Co. 2018) (finding question of fact existed as to whether employer’s customer lists and
23
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noncompete law remained at the tail end of the millennium what it had
always been—a common law body of doctrine largely consistent across
those jurisdictions that are willing to enforce them.28
That is not to say that application of the law has been clear or
consistent.29 Courts apply the rule of reason case-by-case, usually in the
context of a preliminary injunction hearing. The legal inquiry is highly factspecific, and the sentiments of judges toward the instruments varies. Much
ink has been spilt attempting to rank jurisdictions in terms or their support
for or aversion to enforcement,30 and the inability to predict outcomes is a
constant refrain.31 Adding to the uncertainty, during the mid-twentieth
century, courts in some states began to reform overbroad agreements that
would otherwise fail the rule of reason.32 The evolution of this practice has
deepened the variation between jurisdictions,33 contributing to strategic
account information constituted trade secrets justifying enforcement of otherwise invalid
noncompetition and nonsolicitation clauses against sales representative who solicited
business from former clients). In addition, while the statute refers exclusively to “trade
secrets,” decisions sometimes refer to the legitimacy of restraints protecting “confidential
information.” See, e.g., Haggard v. Spine, No. 09-cv-00721-CMA-KMT, 2009 WL 1655030,
at *5–6 (D. Colo. June 12, 2009); see generally Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at
1182−89 (exploring the distinction between trade secret and confidential information). The
upshot is that Colorado law is considerably more tolerant of noncompetes than one might
suppose from reading its statute.
28
See Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 709 (1985) (asserting as of the mid-1980s that the rule of reason “has
survived virtually unchanged to the present day”).
29
For nearly seventy-five years, scholars and courts alike have pointed to the Ohio
Supreme Court’s vivid description of the jurisprudence: “[It is] a sea—vast and vacillating,
overlapping and bewildering” out of which “[o]ne can fish . . . any kind of strange support for
anything.” Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio
1952)
30
See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative
Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility
Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751 (2011); Evan Starr, Consider This: Firm-Sponsored Training
and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REV. 783 (2019). For
a discussion and assessment of the various indexes of state laws, see generally J.J. Prescott,
Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014
Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. STATE L. REV. 369, 458–59 (2016).
31
See Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1243 (describing noncompetes as
“placeholders guaranteeing the employer a judicially crafted remedy”); Orly Lobel,
Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contract in Intellectual Property Law, 96 B.U. L. REV.
869 (2016) [hereinafter Enforceability TBD] (discussing the costs of uncertainty in
noncompete enforcement to the intellectual property regime).
32
See, e.g., Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 196 N.E. 856, 858 (Mass. 1935); Solari
Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53 (NJ 1970); Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70
N.W.2d 585, 592 (Wisc. 1955).
33
This practice appears to have begun with courts merely “blue penciling” – or striking
out—discrete clause, but has evolved into a practice of fully rewriting the overbroad restraint.
See, e.g., Fullerton, 70 N.W.2d 585 at 552 (“[W]e do not see why the basic reason for
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behavior on the part of employers and their counsel.34 These differences,
however, are a matter of application rather than a reflection of the law itself.
In those jurisdictions that enforce them, the governing principles and
doctrinal rules were, until recently, largely the same, and the question of the
legality of noncompetes was considered settled law.
B. Reform Gone Viral
This laconic landscape recently has given way to a viral reform
movement that is fast displacing the status quo. Since 2015, there have been
dozens of state legislative initiatives, at least three bills introduced in
Congress, and a host of regulatory and enforcement efforts at both the state
and federal levels targeting employee noncompetes and other agreements
that limit mobility. This section provides an overview of some of these
developments, focusing on three types of reform efforts: what I refer to as
“vulnerable worker bans” that prohibit noncompetes with low-wage, lowskilled workers; “California-style bans” that seek to void all forms of
employee noncompetes; and “middle way” statutes that impose select
procedural requirements and substantive limitations on how, where, and
under what conditions noncompetes may be imposed and enforced.
1. Protecting the Vulnerable
The most successful reform initiative thus far has been a wide-spread
effort to ban the predatory use of noncompetes with vulnerable workers—
[enforcing] a contract after removing terms which are literally divisible should not also exist
in the case of indivisible promise”); see generally Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements,
Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils: Judicial and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable
Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 223, 245–51 (2007)
(describing the different jurisdictional approaches to unreasonable non-compete agreements,
including “voiding the agreement, using the ‘Blue Pencil’ doctrine to eliminate an
unreasonable term, and using the ‘Blue Pencil’ doctrine to eliminate an unreasonable term
and replace it with a reasonable term.”). In a handful of states, legislation subsequently
overruled or clarified the practice of judicial modification, adding another dimension to the
differences between states on this critical point. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (2020).
I will return to the need for further legislation limiting judicial modification, infra Part IV.
34
See e.g., Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying
Georgia law and voiding noncompete despite its Ohio choice-of-law provision in declaratory
judgment suit where employee had never worked in Ohio and had relocated to Georgia for
position with new employer at time of filing); Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional
Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the
Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 1385–86 (2008) (describing how
companies seek to leverage the pro-noncompete stance of particular jurisdictions through
choice-of-law agreements); Viva Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 939, 943 (2012) (arguing for uniform non-enforcement rule to avoid conflict of laws and
other “state-to-state problems” resulting from jurisdictional differences in noncompete
enforcement).
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those who are either low-wage, low-skilled or both. An employer’s need for
a noncompete in such cases is questionable; such workers are unlikely to
have access to the type of information or customer relationships that would
provide a competitive advantage post-employment.35 Vulnerable workers
are also less likely than their better-paid, higher-skilled counterparts to
comprehend the legal significance of a noncompete or object to its
imposition as a condition of employment. The use of noncompetes in such
situations raises suspicions of unfair dealing.
Over a dozen states have entertained statutory bans on the imposition
of noncompetes on vulnerable workers—defined by reference to a particular
economic indicator or to other employment laws.36 These “vulnerable
worker bans,” as I refer to them, have come both in the form of stand-alone
legislation or in conjunction with other proposed reforms. At least seven
such initiatives have passed and approximately half a dozen are pending or
were recently considered.37 Similar moves have been made at the federal
level. In 2015, Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut introduced the
Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (“MOVE”) Act, which
would have banned noncompetes with employees earning below the federal
35
Indeed, many such agreements would likely be held unenforceable under the rule of
reason were they to be pursued in court. As will be discussed, a core contribution of Professor
Sullivan’s work, and one impetus behind efforts to ban noncompetes in vulnerable
populations, is the recognition that such agreements constrain those who sign them
irrespective of their legality, an issue that may never be litigated. See Puzzling Persistence,
supra note 711, at 1137–39 (explaining why an employee would more likely comply with an
overbroad noncompete than risk being sued); Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622–23
(describing litigated noncompete cases as the “proverbial iceberg’s tip”); infra Part III.B.
36
Many of these efforts use the federal or state minimum wage as a reference. See, e.g.,
ILL. COMP. STAT ch. 820 § 90/5 (West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70-a (2020). Some
track the employee’s exempt or non-exempt status under the Fair Labor Standards Act or its
state law equivalent. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(c)(i) (West 2020).
Others set out threshold income levels. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 26 § 599-A (2019)
(400% of the federal poverty level); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-716 (West 2020)
($15/hour and $31,200 annually); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(1)(d) (West 2016) (U.S.
Census Bureau’s median family income for family of four); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-59-2(7)
(2020) (250% of the federal poverty level for individuals); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
49.62.020(1)(b) (West 2020) (salary of $100,000 per year, to be adjusted annually).
37
Legislation has passed and/or gone into effect in Illinois, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/10
(2018), Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 599-A (2020), Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., LAB.
& EMPL. § 3-716 (West 2020), Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L (West
2020), New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70-a (2020), Rhode Island, 28 R.I. Gen.
Laws § 28-59-3 (2020), and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.62.020 (West 2020).
Bills are pending or were recently considered in Connecticut, H.B. 6913, 2019 Gen. Assemb.,
Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019), Hawaii, H.B. 1059, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019), Indiana, S.B.
348, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019), New Jersey, S.B. 2872, 218th Leg., Ann.
Sess. (N.J. 2018), New York, Assemb. B. 2504, 142nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019),
Pennsylvania, H.B. 563, 2019 Leg., 203rd Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2019), and Virginia, S.B. 1387,
2019 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018).
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or applicable state minimum wage.38 More recently, Senator Marco Rubio
introduced the Freedom to Compete Act, which would amend the Fair Labor
Standards Act to preclude the use of noncompetes with non-exempt
employees subject to minimum wage and overtime requirements.39
In addition to these legislative efforts, a number of regulatory programs
seeking to protect the mobility of vulnerable employees are also underway.
In early 2018, the Washington State Attorney General’s Office spearheaded
a worker protection initiative that aims to eradicate the use of “no poach”
clauses in franchise contracts. “No poach” clauses differ from noncompetes
in that they are found in contracts between business entities, but their effect
is similar: The corporate franchisor requires each individual franchisee, as a
condition of operating, not to employ workers previously employed by
another franchisee, resulting in a de facto bar against employee movement
between corporate locations.40 These franchise employees frequently work
low-skill service jobs such as food preparation, cash register operation, clean
up, and related service and retail tasks for minimum or near-minimum
wage.41
38
The “MOVE” Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015). See generally Lydia DePillis, Can
the Senate Stop Low-Wage Employers from Tying up Workers with Non-competes?, WASH.
POST (June 2, 2015, 3:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/0
2/can-the-senate-stop-low-wage-employers-from-tying-up-their-workers-with-non-compete
s/.
39
Freedom to Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Cong. (2019). See generally Clifford R. Atlas,
Erik J. Winton & Colin A. Thakkar, U.S. Senator Reignites Federal Non-Compete Reform
Efforts with Bill Aimed at Protecting Low-Wage Employees, NAT’L L. R. (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-senator-reignites-federal-non-compete-reformefforts-bill-aimed-protecting-low. This bill is currently in the Committee on Small Business
and Entrepreneurship. CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senatebill/124/all-info (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). Also pending is a more recent bill sponsored by
Senator Murphy and Senator Young that would ban all employee noncompetes, limiting such
restraints to situations involving the sale or disillusion of business entities. See Workforce
Mobility Act of 2019, S. 2614, 116th Cong. (2019); Amanda Jaret & Sandeep Vaheesan, NonCompete Clauses Are Suffocating American Workers, TIME (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://time.com/5753078/non-compete-clauses-american-workers/; infra Part II.B.2.
40
For instance, prior to settling with the AG’s Office, Jimmy John’s standard franchise
contract provided that “Franchisee shall not. . .[e]mploy or seek to employ any person who is
at that time employed by Franchisor or by any Affiliate of Franchisor, or by any other
franchisee of Franchisor, or otherwise directly or indirectly induce or seek to induce such
person to leave his or her employment thereat.” Compl. for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and
Other Relief at 4, State of Wash. v. Jersey Mike Franchise Sys. et. al., No. 1802025822-7
(Wash. King Cty. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2018).
41
Indeed, the Washington AG’s efforts gained popular attention when the media
reported on the use of no poach clauses by the Jimmy John’s sandwich franchise which
eliminated any intra-franchise opportunities for the low-wage workers who assemble its
sandwiches. See Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete
Clause, N. Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/upshot/
when-the-guy-making-your-sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html; Ben Rooney, Jimmy
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The Washington State Attorney General’s office, operating under its
antitrust authority and in conjunction with other states’ offices, has
investigated and reached settlements with over one hundred and fifty
national corporate chains— primarily in the fast food industry, but also with
an expanding array of service and retail operators, including gyms, hotels,
home cleaners, shippers, and tax preparers.42 The negotiated consent
agreements provide that the corporate franchisor will cease requiring “no
poach” clauses in its franchise contracts and refrain from enforcing them in
any existing contract. In at least one instance, the Office initiated litigation
against a franchisor that initially declined to settle,43 and several class-action
suits have been brought on behalf of employees adversely affected by the
clauses.44
John’s Under Fire for Worker Contracts, CNN: MONEY (Oct. 22, 2014, 12:00 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2014/10/22/news/jimmy-johns-non-compete/index.html. No-poach
agreements, however, are not limited to franchise contracts nor do they only affect low wage
workers. In the late 2000s the Department of Justice filed suit and ultimately achieved
settlement with several iconic Silicon Valley technology companies, including Google,
Apple, Adobe, and Intuit, that had informally agreed not to hire each others’ employees. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies
to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010),
https://www.ustice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-compani
es-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee. More recently, then-California Attorney General
Kamala Harris filed suit against eBay for entering into “handshake” agreement with Intuit not
to hire or recruit each other’s employees. See Press Release, Kamala D. Harris, Cal. Att’y
Gen., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Files Lawsuit against eBay for Anticompetitive
Hiring Agreement (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorneygeneral-kamala-d-harris-files-lawsuit-against-ebay-anticompetitive. Such “gentleman’s
agreements” among key industry players are especially notorious given California’s robust
stance against agreements in restraints of trade. See generally Orly Lobel, Gentlemen Prefer
Bonds: How Employers Fix The Talent Market, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 663, 668–70 (2020)
[hereinafter Gentlemen Prefer Bonds] (discussing the Google litigation and settlement and the
DOJ’s investigation of other “horizontal” collusions limiting worker mobility).
42
See Press Release, Bob Ferguson, Wash. Att’y Gen., AAG to Testify to Congress as
AG Ferguson’s Anti-No-Poach Initiative Reaches 155 Corporate Chains (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/aag-testify-congress-ag-ferguson-s-anti-nopoach-initiative-reaches-155-corporate; see generally Gentleman Prefer Bonds, supra note
40 (discussing these and related efforts).
43
Attorney General Ferguson filed suit against Jersey Mike’s for violation of antitrust
provisions in Washington’s Consumer Protection Act after the company refused to remove
no-poach clauses from their existing franchise contracts. See Press Release, Bob Ferguson,
Wash. Att’y Gen., AG Ferguson Announces Major Milestones in Initiative to Eliminate NoPoach Clauses Nationwide, Files Lawsuit Against Jersey Mikes (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-announces-major-milestonesinitiative-eliminate-no-poach-clauses. The suit subsequently settled.
44
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 2, Turner v. McDonald’s USA, No. 1:19-cv05524 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2019); Class Action Complaint at 1, Griffith v. H&R Block, Inc.,
No. 4:19-cv-00470-ODS (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2018); Plaintiff’s Antitrust Class Action
Complaint at 1, Rice v. Arby’s Franchisor, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-00131-NRN (D. Colo. Jan. 15,
2019); Class Action Complaint at 1, Fuentes v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., No. 18-5174 (E.D. Pa.
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Similar work has been underway, albeit with less national attention, to
address the direct use of noncompetes with employees. The New York and
Illinois Attorneys General’s Offices, for instance, have been investigating
the use of unreasonable noncompetes, broadly defined, based on employee
complaints. Like the Washington Attorney General’s Office, they have
proceeded primarily through their investigative power, achieving settlements
with several large employers45 and in some cases, initiating litigation.46 The
New York initiative includes a direct information campaign targeting
individual employees. The Office has disseminated an easy-to-understand
question and answer sheet explaining workers’ rights and options before and
after signing a noncompete and urging workers to report abusive
agreements.47
In sum, there is a developing consensus in favor of outright bans against
employers’ use of noncompetes with certain vulnerable populations. The
movement is playing out primarily at the state level through the efforts of
legislatures and chief law enforcement offices, although there is interest at
the federal level as well.48 These efforts, while limited in scope, have been
Nov. 29, 2018); Class Action Complaint at 1, Houston v. Papa Johns Int’l, Inc., No. 3:18-cv825-JHM (W.D. Ky. Dec. 14, 2018); see generally Gentlemen Prefer Bonds, supra note 41
(discussing such litigation).
45
See New York State, Office of the Attorney General, Non-Compete Agreements in
New York State: Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/fil
es/non-competes.pdf; see also Aruna Viswanatha, Sandwich Chain Jimmy John’s to Drop
Noncompete Clauses from Hiring Packets, THE WALL STREET J. (June 21, 2016, 9:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sandwich-chain-jimmy-johns-to-drop-noncompete-clausesfrom-hiring-packets-1466557202; Elliot Brown, WeWork Reaches Settlement on Noncompete
Pacts, THE WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2018, 4:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ar
ticles/wework-reaches-settlement-on-noncompete-pacts-1537304008.
46
See, e.g., People of Ill. v. Check Into Cash of Ill., LLC, No. 2017-CH-14224 (Cook
County Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 25, 2017); People of Ill. v. Jimmy John’s Enters., LLC, No. 2016CH-07746 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed June 8, 2016); see generally State of Illinois, Office
of the Attorney General, Overuse of Non-Competition Agreements: Understanding How They
Are Used, Who They Harm, and What State Attorneys General Can Do to Protect the Public
Interest (June 13, 2018), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/webpage_materi
als_papers_madigan_flanagan_june_13_2018.pdf.
47
See New York State, supra note 45. More recently the Washington AG’s Office
expanded its Worker Protection Initiative to similarly consider abusive noncompete
practicing, filing litigation and ultimately achieving a settlement with a coffee shop requiring
such agreements of its barristas. See Press Release, Bob Ferguson, Wash. Att’y Gen.,
Attorney General Bob Ferguson Stops King County Coffee Shop’s Practice Requiring
Baristas To Sign Unfair Non-Compete Agreements (Oct. 29, 2019) https://www.atg.wa.gov/
news/news-releases/attorney-general-bob-ferguson-stops-king-county-coffee-shop-s-practic
e-requiring.
48
For instance, Congress received testimony from the Washington Attorney General’s
Office regarding its anti-no poach and expanded non-compete initiative at a hearing on Labor
Market Competition held late last year. See U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing: Antitrust
and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets available at
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successful in prohibiting some of the most abusive uses of noncompetes.
2. Chasing California
In contrast to these narrowly targeted efforts, a handful of reformers
have set their sights higher. At the federal level, Senator Chris Murphy last
year introduced legislation seeking a federal California-style ban on
noncompetes.49 Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission is considering a
petition, supported by various scholars and interest groups, calling on the
agency to use its rulemaking authority to declare employee noncompetes an
unfair method of competition.50
At the state level, in 2015, Hawaii adopted a California-style ban solely
for the technology sector.51 A hat tip to the Golden State, the law’s explicit
goal was to stimulate and protect Hawaii’s high-tech industry, eliminating
barriers to hiring and staunching brain drain.52 Three state legislatures are
considering or recently considered bills proposing California-style bans on
all employee noncompetes throughout the state. Vermont last year
introduced a bill voiding restraints on employee competition in language
almost identical to California’s law.53 Illinois legislators proposed amending
that state’s recently enacted vulnerable worker ban to void all noncompetes
irrespective of the worker’s income status.54 Pennsylvania legislators
proposed a bill declaring noncompetes “illegal, unenforceable and void as a
matter of law.”55

https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventId=110152.
49
See Workforce Mobility Act, supra note 39. Murphy’s bill ups the ante on Senator
Rubio’s Freedom to Compete Act that would create a federal vulnerable worker ban. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text. It was introduced with bi-partisan support.
50
The Author of this article is a signatory to the petition. See Open Markets Institute et
al., Petition for Rulemaking to Prohibit Worker Non-Compete Clauses (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://openmarketsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Petition-for-Rulemaking-toProhibit-Worker-Non-Compete-Clauses.pdf; Josh Eidelson, Labor Groups Petition U.S. FTC
to Ban Non-Compete Clauses, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2019, 1:22 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-20/labor-groups-petition-u-s-ftc-toprohibit-non-compete-clauses. The agency held a hearing earlier this year to consider the
state of the law and the economic research on noncompetes and has sought public comment.
Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues, FTC
(Jan. 9, 2020) https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/non-competes-workpla
ce-examining-antitrust-consumer-protection-issues.
51
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-4(d) (West 2015).
52
See Enforceability TBD, supra note 31, at 887–88 (2016) (discussing the Hawaii
statute’s legislative history).
53
H.B 1, 2019-2020 Leg., Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2019).
54
H.B. 2565, 2019 Leg., 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019).
55
H.B. 171, 203rd Gen. Assemb., 2019 Sess. (Pa. 2019).
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Meanwhile, in Oklahoma, a series of legislative and judicial
developments have resulted in that state becoming the third jurisdiction in
the United States to ban noncompetes outright. Since the turn of the century,
Oklahoma’s labor code included language similar to the noncompete bans in
California and North Dakota.56 Beginning in the 1970s, however, in a series
of cases primarily involving non-solicitation agreements, the state supreme
court ruled that the Oklahoma statute applied only to complete prohibitions
on an individual practicing his or her profession.57 These holdings suggested
that noncompetes satisfying the common law rule of reason could survive
the statutory prohibition.58 That interpretation was foreclosed recently when
the Oklahoma legislature passed amendments in 200159 and 201360 to
expressly permit nonsolicitation agreements, while declaring all other forms
of restraint “void and unenforceable.”61 The effect of these changes is to
overrule the prior caselaw permitting reasonable noncompetes, and the
consensus is that Oklahoma is now a nonenforcement state.62
The developments in Oklahoma are clearly idiosyncratic, a seeming

56
Prior to recent amendments, it provided: “Every contract by which any one is
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind [other than in the
context of a sale of business or dissolution of a partnership] is to that extent void.” OKLA.
STAT. tit. 15, §217 (2018). For an historical account of the Oklahoma statue and its
relationship to California and North Dakota law, see generally Jeb Boatman, Note, Contract
Law: As Clear as Mud: The Demise of the Covenant Not to Compete in Oklahoma, 55 OKLA.
L. REV. 491 (2002); Teresa L. Green, Note, The Shifting Landscape of Restrictive Covenants
in Oklahoma, 40 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 449, 459–65 (2015).
57
See, e.g., Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 640 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1981); Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977); Tatum v.
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1970). See generally Boatman, supra
note 56, at 498–99 (describing this interpretive history); Green, supra note 3, at 459–61
(same).
58
See Board of Regents, etc. v. Nat. Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 561 P.2d 499, 508 (Okla.
1977) (concluding that the “[validity of a] restraint of trade must be determined by its
reasonableness in view of the particular circumstance. An agreement in illegal restraint of
trade is void, but an agreement in reasonable restraint of trade is valid.”)
59
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15., §§ 217, 219A (2001) (permitting agreements that prohibit a
former employee from “directly solicit[ing] the sale of goods, services or a combination of
goods and services from the established customers of the former employer.”).
60
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15., § 219B (2013) (permitting agreements that prohibit a former
employee “from soliciting . . . the employees or independent contractors of that person or
business to become employees or independent contractors of another person or business”).
61
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15., § 219A(B) (2001).
62
See Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., 273 P.3d 20, 28 (Okla. 2011) (determining that “[t]he
plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, and unequivocal language of [the 2001
amendments] prohibits employers from binding employees to agreements which bar their
ability to find gainful employment in the same business or industry as that of the employer”
with the “only exception” being nonsolicitation agreements), vacated on other grounds 133
S.Ct. 500 (2012); see generally Green, supra note 3, at 462–63.
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rectification of a suspect interpretation of the state’s original statute.63 Yet
the timing is telling, occurring at the onset of the new enforcement regime.
It is unclear whether any of the pending bills proposing California-style bans
have hopes of succeeding.64 Prospects at the federal level seem bleak with
the nation entering an election year and Congress having failed to act on less
dramatic legislation in the past. At a minimum these initiatives have
symbolic value, attesting to how far interest in noncompete reform has
reached. As a practical matter, they may play an anchoring role in debates
on the subject, funneling support toward more incremental legislation like
the “middle way” initiatives discussed next.
3. Seeking Middle Ground
Beyond these two extremes, a handful of states have adopted or are
considering adopting what I refer to as “middle way” legislation. There is
no one model for these laws, but they can be collectively described as
multipart statutes that aim to restrict the use of noncompetes primarily
through one or more of the following mechanisms: (1) limiting their
substantive terms, (2) establishing procedural protections for workers asked
to sign them, and (3) imposing penalties or other consequences on employers
who violate the law.
With respect to substantive limits, a consistent feature of middle way
legislation is that it incorporates or exists alongside the type of vulnerable
worker ban described previously.65 But this is just a starting point. Middle
way legislation goes on to set limits on the substantive terms of noncompetes
sought from workers who satisfy the state’s income threshold. These
interventions are idiosyncratic and cover different types of terms. Some seek
to define the outer bounds of the noncompete’s scope. For instance,
63

See Boatman, supra note 56, at 501 (“While [the recent statutory] amendments initially
may seem radical, a close inspection . . . reveals that the amendments simply bring Oklahoma
statutes in line with established case law.”).
64
While data supports the conclusion that greater employee mobility improves economic
conditions in certain important respects, see infra Part III, noncompetes offer benefits to the
individual employers who rely on them to protect their assets and retain talent. From this
perspective, noncompetes pose a classic collective action problem that a ban is well suited to
address. See Orly Lobel, Non-Competes, Human Capital Policy & Regional Competition, J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=3473186. As Professor Orly Lobel explains, however, not all firms stand to
benefit from so drastic a regime change and some may rationally prefer retaining the status
quo or at least a moderate enforcement climate. Id. at 12 (cautioning that “a one size fits all
approach may not be appropriate” in all regions and industries). Indeed, proposed Californiastyle bans have been met with staunch resistance from the business community. See Aimee
Keane, Non-Compete Clauses Prompt an American Backlash, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/3196e048-4e6a-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a.
65
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 599 (2019); supra Part II.B.1.
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Massachusetts’ new law and Connecticut’s law on physician agreements cap
the duration of noncompetes at twelve months.66
Oregon’s and
Washington’s laws allow the employer a maximum of eighteen months,67
while a bill considered in New Hampshire would limit the employer to six
months.68 Other interventions seek to regulate the terms of the exchange.
Some state legislation requires, for instance, that employees who sign a
noncompete after beginning employment69 receive identifiable consideration
in addition to continued employment.70 Others mandate that the employer
compensate the employee when and if the restraint goes into effect, requiring
so-called “garden leave” or its equivalent.71
66
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(iv) (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
20-14p (West 2019).
67
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.62.020
(West 2020);
68
H. B. 346, 2019 Leg., 166th Sess. (N.H. 2019).
69
I refer to these types of contractualized adjustments of employment terms during the
course of an existing employment relationship as “midterm” modifications. See Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 427, 428 (2016).
Such adjustments are problematic as a matter of contract law and from a fairness perspective
because they are generally extracted on explicit or implicit threat of termination. See id.;
Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompetition
Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The “Afterthought”
Agreement, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465 (1987); Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of
Noncompetition Agreements when Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 95,118 (1998).
70
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(ii) (West 2020) (requiring “fair
and reasonable consideration independent from the continuation of employment”); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.020(1)(a)(ii) (West 2020) (requiring “independent consideration”);
see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295 (West 2016) (requiring such an agreement to be
“entered into upon a bona fide advancement” in the employee’s position).
71
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii) (West 2020) (requiring garden
leave at fifty percent of the employee’s salary or “other mutually-agreed upon
consideration”); id. (permitting enforcement of a noncompete following a termination due to
layoff only in the event that the employer continues to pay the employee’s salary); S. B. 635,
2018 Leg., 218th Sess. (N.J. 2018) (requiring garden leave at full salary); H. B. 346, 2019
Leg., 166th Sess. (N.H. 2019) (requiring fifty percent of the employee’s salary). “Garden
leave” is a concept inherited from the U.K. that requires an employer to pay the employee for
any post-work period in which the employee is prohibited from competing. See generally
Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability
of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2002) (discussing history
and current state of the doctrine in England). It has appeal as a possible solution to the
problem of forced unemployment resulting from overly broad restraints. Yet it has received
relatively little attention from scholars, Professor Sullivan being one of the few exceptions.
Tending the Garden, supra note 12, at 322–23 (predicting increased adoption of garden leave
provisions in high-level employment contracts with mixed results for employees); see also
Estlund, supra note 7 at 425 (suggesting that garden leave might be made a condition of
enforceability which would force the employer to bear the cost of employee’s “forced
idleness”); Lembrich, supra note 71, at 2321–23 (suggesting that garden leave offers
employers greater predictability of enforcement while better balancing the competing
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Still other substantive interventions are aimed at limiting or
encouraging particular terms without directly mandating them. In Oregon,
for instance, an employer who provides garden leave may enforce a
noncompete without regard to the state’s minimum income threshold.72 In
Massachusetts a restriction limited to the “specific types of services”
provided by the employee in the geographic area where those services were
provided is “presumptively reasonable.”73 In Washington, a duration
exceeding eighteen months is “presume[d] . . .
unreasonable and
unenforceable.”74 Such provisions encourage employers to draft within
preferred limits in order to obtain what are essentially evidentiary
advantages.
With respect to procedural protections, a common feature of middle
way statutes is the requirement of advance notice of the noncompete
combined with an opportunity to review. Oregon requires at least two
weeks;75 Massachusetts requires ten days.76 A bill recently considered in
New Jersey would have required thirty business days in advance of signing
as well as notice of the employer’s intent to enforce the noncompete within
ten days of the employee’s separation.77 Massachusetts’s law and legislation
proposed in several neighboring states require the employee to be informed
of the right to consult counsel.78 At least one state proposal would have
imposed a “poster” requirement of the type commonly mandated by federal
employment protection legislation.79
interests of restrained workers). Empirical research examining possible changes to wages and
mobility of noncompete signers post-adoption would be of great value.
72
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(6) (West 2016) (declaring a noncompete enforceable
“without regard” to the statute’s vulnerable worker ban if the employer provides at least fifty
percent of the employee’s salary or fifty percent of the median income for a family of four for
the duration of the restriction); cf. H. B. 6913, 2019 Leg., (Conn. 2019) (permitting an
employer that provides at least one year of full pay to a restrained employee to exceed the
bill’s twelve month duration cap by up to two years ).
73
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(iii) (West 2020).
74
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.62.020(2) (West 2020). Florida has had statutory
minimum and maximum duration presumptions since the 1990s, well before the current
legislative trend. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(d)(1) (“[A] court shall presume
reasonable in time any restraint 6 months or less in duration and shall presume unreasonable
in time any restraint more than 2 years in duration.”).
75
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(1)(a)(A) (West 2016).
76
MASS GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 149 § 24L(b)(ii) (West 2020).
77
S.B. 635, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018). Such a provision has the effect of a
statute of limitations, allowing the employee to act freely and without fear of litigation
following the proscribed time period.
78
MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 24L(b)(iii); S.B. 635, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J.
2018); H.B. 6913, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019); H.B. 346, 166th Leg. Sess., 2019
Session (N.H. 2019).
79
The New Jersey bill would have required employers to post a copy of either the law
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A final, albeit less common, feature of some middle way legislation and
proposed laws is that they establish penalties or other consequences aimed
at deterring and redressing employer violations. Maine’s law grants the state
department of labor enforcement responsibility and imposes a civil fine of at
least $5,000 on any employer who violates the law.80 Washington’s law goes
further, creating a private right of action for victims of unlawful noncompete
practices. Signers can recover actual damages sustained as a result of a
violation of the law or liquidated damages, plus costs and attorneys’ fees.81
The “middle way” legislation described here, along with future state
initiatives, will likely prove a critical component of the new enforcement
regime. In the absence of federal action or the will to impose outright bans,
these laws will be the primary pathway for reform. Their ability to
fundamentally alter employers’ use of noncompetes and the rules of
enforcement will depend on the particular measures adopted, a question I
turn to in Part IV. At a minimum, they impose important, if discrete, new
limits on employer noncompete practices and, in some cases, additional
protections for employees.
III. JUSTIFYING THE NEW REGIME
The previous section provided an overview of the new enforcement
regime. This section seeks to explain it. It would be rash, of course, to
attribute the new enforcement regime to any particular cause or
development. It arises, however, in tandem with growing empirical research
questioning long-held assumptions about the use of noncompetes and their
effects on both workers and the economy. There are at least two implications
from this work. First, there is now good reason to believe that noncompetes
adversely affect wages and economic growth.82 Second, there is growing
evidence that employers overreach in their use of noncompetes, either by
requiring them in situations where they are unenforceable or by drafting
stronger restraints than the law allows.83 Such research validates the
speculations of some legal scholars, among them Professor Sullivan, who

itself or an agency-approved summary in a prominent workplace location. S.B. 635, 218th
Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018); see also The “MOVE” Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015)
(imposing a similar requirement).
80
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 599-A6 (2019).
81
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.62.080 (West 2019); see also S.B. 635, 218th Leg., Ann.
Sess. (N.J. 2018) (protecting an employee who challenges the validity of a noncompete
against employer reprisals). In Washington, these remedies are available to the employee
even if the court partially enforces the agreement. § 49.62.080(3). This strikes a critical
balance that I will take up further in Part IV, infra.
82
See infra Part III.A.
83
See infra Part III.B.
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have asserted that current doctrinal limits on noncompetes do not go far
enough in addressing their pernicious collective effects or policing
opportunistic employer behavior.84 This section examines the emerging data
through the lens of Professor Sullivan’s past work and demonstrates how his
writings lay a theoretical groundwork for recent empirical research that is, in
turn, fueling the new enforcement regime.
A. The Collective Effects of Individual Agreements
The law and economics of noncompetes are subtle and complex. On
one hand, noncompetes are private agreements to which the parties assent,
presumably because they deem the agreement to be in their interests.
Freedom of contract principles dictate that they be enforced as written.85 On
the other hand, noncompetes are restraints of trade that reduce opportunities
for those in the field and the public’s access to their goods and services.86
Open competition and principles of free trade dictate that they be limited to
ensure a robust economy.
In the battle between these competing first principles, freedom of
contract has long been the victor. The traditional law and economics view
held that the removal of any one individual from the field of competition was

84
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1151 (arguing that current judicial doctrine fails
to adequately discourage overbroad restraints); Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622–
23 (describing collective effects of noncompetes including depressed wages and employee
“lock in”); See also Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1189 (suggesting that employers
impermissibly use noncompetes to restrain workers rather than protect their legitimate
interests); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 963, 976–84 (2006) (arguing that employers’ opportunistic contracting practices
constrain workers’ ability to evaluate or bargain over noncompetes) [hereinafter “The Dilution
of Employee Bargaining Power”]; Estlund, supra note 7, at 424–25 (arguing for a “strict
scrutiny” approach to noncompetes and other “conditionally waivable” employee rights); cf.
Gentlemen Prefer Bonds, supra note 41, at 667–68 (describing the various ways that
California employers seek to subvert the law and constrain worker mobility despite the state’s
interdiction against noncompetes).
85
See Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that noncompetes should be enforced absent grounds for ordinary
contract defenses); Callahan, supra note 28, at 725–27 (same); cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints
on the Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 383 (1993) (asserting that rules
limiting noncompete enforcement undermine individual freedom to alienate one’s human
capital).
86
See Blake, supra note 1, at 687 (“One situation in which social cost might be different
from private cost exists when the restraint is being used, either by the employer alone or in a
bilateral arrangement with his employees, to monopolize the business in a specific
community.”); Eric A. Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in
Employment Contracts (Sept. 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3453433 21–23 (offering a
taxonomy of the adverse effects of noncompetes on labor and product markets).
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unlikely to do economic damage to any industry.87 Presumably, the rule of
reason could do the job of discerning between those restraints that merely
limited opportunity for the individual signer and those that had broader anticompetitive effects.88 As applied, however, the rule of reason focuses almost
exclusively on the competing interests of the individual litigants. Many
formulations of the basic rule of reason require consideration of the
agreement’s potential impact on the public interest.89 Yet few courts actually
engage in that inquiry,90 nor is it clear how such a factual determination
would be made.91 In a subset of cases where the noncompete involves a
health care provider or other individual whose services are necessary to the
public welfare, courts will sometimes consider whether other providers are
available in the former employer’s geographic area in an effort to protect
consumer choice.92 Outside that situation, however, courts mostly treat
their evaluation of the harm to the individual worker as a proxy for the
noncompete’s fairness to the public.93
87
See, e.g., Outsource Int’l, Inc., 192 F.3d at 670 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“It would be
unlikely for the vitality of competition to depend on the ability of a former employee to
compete with his former employer.”); Sterk, supra note 85, at 407 (“The anticompetitive
effect of enforcing restrictive covenants. . .will probably be insignificant. Indeed, only the
employer and the
employee are likely to see any effects.”); see generally LOBEL, supra note 7 (describing the
“orthodox” view of noncompetes held by early law and economic thinkers).
88
See Outsource Int’l, Inc., 192 F.3d at 670 (Posner, J., dissenting) (suggesting that anticompetitive effects from individual noncompetes are “[s]o unlikely that it would make little
sense to place a cloud of suspicion over such covenants, rather than considering competitive
effects on a case by case basis”).
89
See, e.g., Barbagallo v. Marcum LLP, 820 F. Supp. 2d 429, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2011;
Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 2011); Dawson v. Temps
Plus, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 722, 727 (Ark. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188
(1981) (declaring a noncompete unreasonably in restraint of trade where “the promisee’s need
is outweighed by . . . the likely injury to the public”).
90
See Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1173–74 (critiquing courts for paying
lip-service to the public interest without actually applying this prong of the test); Gillian
Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost
Analysis, 76 IND. L. J. 49, 56 (2001) (“The bite of the reasonableness analysis rests principally
in the [factors] pertaining to the scope of the restrictions: a restraint deemed reasonable in
scope typically will not be invalidated due to public interest or hardship alone.”).
91
Professor Sullivan lays out a series of factors that should come into play in assessing
a noncompete’s public effects, including the degree of labor market concentration and the
specialized or essential nature of the employee’s work. See Neglected Stepchild, supra note
10, at 647–50. However, it may be beyond the capacity of courts to make such assessments
in the context of individual cases. I return briefly to this concern in my proscription infra,
which focuses primarily on employer overreach rather than antitrust concerns.
92
See, e.g., Marsh USA, Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Tex. 2011); Carter-Shields
v. Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
93
See Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 739 (1982) (“[C]ase-by-case judicial treatment
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Professor Sullivan was an early critic of this approach. In the late 1970s
he published Revisiting the “Neglected Stepchild”: Antitrust Treatment of
Postemployment Restraints of Trade, in which he argued that the existing
common law gave insignificant attention to the economic implications of
noncompetes.94 He pointed out that, under antitrust law, neither the
agreement of the parties nor the legitimate interests of the employer could
justify a restraint deemed unreasonable.95 As a consequence, he argued that
otherwise “reasonable” noncompetes could violate Section 1 of the Sherman
Act and that state-level noncompete doctrine might be in conflict with
federal antitrust law.96 To remedy this problem, he asserted, “courts should
look to the general use of [noncompetes] in the industry to determine whether
the collective effect of such practices is to lock-in classes of key employees
so as to create a general barrier to competition.”97
Underlying Sullivan’s analysis were two factual assumptions: first, that
the incidence of noncompetes was far wider than could be surmised from
reported caselaw;98 and second, that as a consequence, noncompetes were
likely to have collective effects beyond what a court would likely discern
when looking solely at the relative positions of the litigants in any one case.99
Writing in 1977, Professor Sullivan acknowledged the dearth of empirical
data available to support those assumptions and speculated that the collective
effects of noncompetes might well be immeasurable.100
Today we know that Professor Sullivan’s premises were correct and his
fears well founded. First, noncompetes and other instruments that restrict
employee mobility are more widely used than once supposed. Industry-level
data suggests that they are quite routine in certain professions—notably
among physicians and engineers—and that they are a bread-and-butter-

of the public injury factor has not extended beyond a concern for the prevention of monopoly
or serious anticompetitive impact. Public injury has been treated generically—that is, as the
rationale for antimonopoly prohibitions and not as a separate negative factual requirement.”).
94
Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622.
95
Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 642.
96
Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 623, 627.
97
Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 647–48.
98
Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622–23 (suggesting that the reported decisions
on noncompetes “constituted the proverbial iceberg’s tip”).
99
See Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 623.
100
Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622–23 (characterizing suppositions about the
incidence of noncompetes as the product of an “armchair survey”). This is not a criticism of
Professor Sullivan’s work, but rather the norm in legal scholarship, particularly in the
noncompete literature prior to the boom in empirical scholarship discussed infra. See
Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, at 372 (describing the wealth of “provocative, but
ultimately limited” studies “fueled by unsupported assumptions and by high-profile anecdotal
evidence of purportedly abusive practices involving noncompetes”).
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feature of CEO contracts.101 But beyond these highly skilled, highly
compensated job sectors, noncompetes appear with frequency in ordinary
employment relationships. In 2014, researchers administered the first
nationwide representative survey of labor force participants asking about
their experience with noncompetes.102 The results of the 2014 Noncompete
Project revealed that nearly one in five participants was bound by a
noncompete at the time of response,103 and nearly forty percent had signed
one at some point in their career.104 Presently, an estimated twenty-eight
million workers are subject to a noncompete.105 Moreover, while the
majority of workers in the study who had signed noncompetes held a college
degree, twelve percent of those without a degree had signed one as well. 106
Thus, the mere incidence of noncompetes suggests reason for concern.
Second, there is increased evidence that noncompetes in the aggregate
adversely affect regional economies and labor markets. Twenty years after
Professor Sullivan’s contribution, Professor Ronald Gilson wrote a highly
influential article, arguing that California’s aberrational approach to
noncompetes—its strict rule that all employee noncompetes are void and
unenforceable—explained, at least in part, the phenomenal growth and
economic success of Silicon Valley as compared to Massachusetts’ less
robust Route 128 high-tech corridor.107 Gilson theorized that the
unenforceability of noncompetes in California resulted in greater
“knowledge spillovers”—the transmission of information from company to
company through mobile employees—enabling and sustaining more
successful regional development.108
101

According to researchers, forty-three percent of engineers, fifty percent of physicians,
and between fifty and eighty percent of Chief Executive Officers sign noncompetes. See
Norman Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 497 (2016) (summarizing studies). There is also firm-level data demonstrating that over
fifty percent of companies use noncompetes according to their human resources personnel.
Id. at 520. That research, however, does not reveal how widely each company uses the
agreements. Id. (discussing the limited value of such undifferentiated data).
102
See Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force
(U. of Michigan Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-013, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2625714.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 2.
106
Id. at 2–3. That is not to say that noncompetes are always unlawful or unjustified with
non-degree holding employees, only that it belies past assumptions that they were used
sparingly with key employees.
107
See Gilson, supra note 3, at 577–80.
108
Gilson, supra note 3, at 578. For a more thorough account of the concept of spillovers
and its treatment in early economic literature, see Alan Hyde, Intellectual Property
Justifications for Restricting Employee Mobility: A Critical Appraisal in Light of the
Economic Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND
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Gilson’s Article stoked new interest in noncompete enforcement and
the regulation of human capital.109 Its legacy includes both a richer legal
literature110 and a body of empirical work testing the broader economic
effects of noncompete enforcement.111 Much of the latter research supports
the positive connection between labor mobility and regional growth that
underlies Gilson’s argument: by studying various indicators—including firm
entry, industry spinouts, and venture capital impact, among others—and
comparing them across jurisdictions, researchers have concluded that
noncompete enforcement reduces firm-level competition, entrepreneurship,
and growth.112
That research has also revealed the pernicious effects of noncompete
covenants on labor markets. Sullivan’s motivation in appealing to antitrust
law was not to enhance economic development but to protect workers. In
his 1977 article he sketched a troubling picture of non-compete signers
indentured to their employers or forced to take career detours, resulting in
lower wages and limited opportunity.113 In fact, almost all of the post-Gilson
empirical work focusing on labor market effects confirm this view. Not
surprisingly, noncompete enforcement is associated with longer job tenure
and reduced mobility.114 Yet it is also associated with lower wages, belying
EMPLOYMENT LAW 357, 361–62 (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds., 2012).
109
See Lobel, supra note 64 (crediting Gilson with creating the field of human capital
law).
110
Of particular note is the work of Professor Orly Lobel, whose scholarship expands on
Gilson’s to examine, among other things, the role of other forms of “human capital controls”
and their intersection with intellectual property law, economic theory, and the business and
management literature. See, e.g, LOBEL, supra note 7, at 51; Lobel, supra note 64; Gentlemen
Prefer Bonds, supra note 41; Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law
and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 (2015).
111
See generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 101, at 523–34 (providing an overview of
the literature); Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, 381-89 (same).
112
This research is methodologically diverse and has been exhaustively catalogued by
others. For examples, see, e.g., Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants:
Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 427 (2011); Evan Starr,
Natarajan Balasubramanian & Mariko Sakakibara, Screening Spinouts? How Noncompete
Enforceability Affects the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms, 64 MGMT. SCI. 552,
552–53 (2018); Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic
Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175, 194 (2003). For a
comprehensive literature review, including an account of the limitations of existing data, see
generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 101, at 523–34; Posner, supra note 86, at 18–19;
Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, at 381–89.
113
See Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 623.
114
See, e.g., Natarajan Balasubramanian, et al., Locked In? The Enforceability of
Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers, J. HUM. RESOURCES
(forthcoming) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2905782 (finding 8%
fewer job opportunities and lower cumulative earnings among technology workers in
noncompete enforcing jurisdictions verses non-enforcement jurisdictions); Matt Marx,
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classical economic theory that predicts that signers will receive a wage
premium for accepting a post-employment restraint.115 Studies put the wage
differential at anywhere from two to eight percent, depending on the market
studied, with estimates of between fourteen and twenty-one percent for those
who actually sign.116 There is evidence that negative wage and mobility
effects are felt not just by rank-and-file workers, but also by high-level,
highly skilled employees who have significant bargaining power.117
In sum, Sullivan’s views have become mainstream. State attorneys
general and private litigants are leveraging the very theory he espoused—
employer liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act—in challenging
franchise anti-poach agreements and the noncompete practices of employers
with significant market power.118 Meanwhile, both regulators and scholars
are giving serious consideration to the idea that antitrust law should have
something more to say about labor market concentration.119 That does not
Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete
Experiment, 55(6) MGMT. SCI. 875, 876 (2009) (finding reduced mobility among patent
holding-employees in Michigan following that state’s reversal of policy in favor of
noncompete enforcement); Starr, Prescott & Bishara, supra note 102 (finding 11% increase
in job tenure for noncompete signers); cf. Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete
Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 702–03
(2011) (finding more than 87% of job moves by engineers subject to a noncompete were
industry exits).
115
See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10
J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 99–101 (1981) (proceeding from this assumption).
116
See, e.g., Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements,
Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376 (2011) (finding
8.2% reduction in executive compensation growth following stricter non-compete
enforcement); Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of
NonCompete Agreements (Sept. 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452240 (finding 2-3%
wage increase among low-wage workers after passage of Oregon vulnerable worker ban);
Starr, supra note 30 (finding 4% wage difference between enforcing and non-enforcing
states); see generally Posner, supra note 86 (summarizing findings).
117
See, e.g., Balasubramanian, et al., supra note 114 (technologists); Mark J. Garmaise,
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm
Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376 (2011) (corporate executives); Marx, supra note 114
(engineers); but see Kurt Lavetti, et al. The Impacts of Restricting Mobility of Skilled Service
Workers: Evidence from Physicians (2018), http://kurtlavetti.com/UIPNC_vf.pdf (finding
physicians who sign noncompetes earn more and have greater returns than those who do not);
see generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 101, at 518–20, 526–31 (summarizing these
findings and others).
118
See supra Part II.B.1.
119
See Ioana Marinescu & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor
Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031, 1023-33 (2019) (applying “well-established economic doctrine
and traditional antitrust rules” to “mergers that facilitate anticompetitive wage and salary
suppression”); Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (2018) (arguing for regulatory consideration of
labor market effects in approving corporate mergers); Federal Trade Commission Announces
Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21 st Century 4
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mean that antitrust law is or need be the primary vehicle for curtailing the
economic harms associated with widespread noncompete use; clearly statelevel legislation will have a large role to play in the new enforcement
regime.120 The point, rather, is that the alarm Sullivan sounded forty-odd
years ago on the macro-effects of noncompetes has been not only justified,
it is at last being heeded.
B. Employer Overreach and Employee Ignorance
The previous section asserted that the collective effects of noncompetes
on wages and growth are insufficiently captured by the common law rule of
reason and its statutory overlay. The argument is agnostic, however, as to
employer compliance with that body of law and to the legitimacy of any one
contract. Even noncompetes that strike a reasonable balance between
employer and employee might, if sufficiently pervasive in a particular
industry, result in externalities justifying further regulation. But are
noncompetes generally reasonable? That is to say, does the rule of reason
adequately police individual fairness, even if it gives short shrift to broader
market concerns?
Many legal scholars, myself included, have long been skeptical of
employer noncompete practices, particularly in the era of standard form
contracts and corporatized human resource departments.121 This fear is
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/hearings-competition-consumer-protection21st-century/hearings-announcement_0_0.pdf (setting hearing on the “evidence and analysis
of monopsony power. . . in labor markets”); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Public Workshop On
Competition In Labor Markets (Sept. 23, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/atr/public-workshopcompetition-labor-markets (holding public workshop on “the role of antitrust [in] labor
markets and promoting robust competition for the American worker”); Fed. Trade Comm.,
Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues (Jan.
9, 2020) at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/non-competes-workplaceexamining-antitrust-consumer-protection-issues (holding public workshop “to examine
whether there is a sufficient legal basis and empirical economic support to promulgate a
Commission Rule that would restrict the use of non-compete clauses in employer-employee
employment contracts”). Federal interest in the subject began in 2016 during the Obama
administration but waned thereafter. See Treasury Report, Non-Compete Contracts:
Economic Effects and Policy Implications at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Noncompetes%20Report.pdf; White House 2016 Report Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of
the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Responses at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/si
tes/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf. It is now being picked up at the agency
level.
120
See supra Part II.B.
121
See e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term,
Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 639 (2007) (describing use
of “boilerplate [noncompete] documents, unilaterally drafted by the employer and presented
as a condition of employment, often subsequent to the start of work”) [hereinafter Rise of
Delayed Term]; The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 978
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compounded by the reality that the enforceability of most noncompetes is
unlikely to be litigated.122 Thirty years after his antitrust contribution,
Sullivan expanded on these concerns. In a 2009 article focusing on the
prevalence of “unenforceable contract terms” in employment relationships,
he argued that the current law is ineffective in policing overbroad
noncompete terms and fails to adequately deter employer overreach.123 He
argued that owing to information deficits and risk aversion, employees are
unlikely to question or challenge an employer’s demand for a noncompete.124
During the course of employment, these employees may avoid seeking out
other jobs or reject alternate employment because they either assume the
noncompete they signed is binding or are unwilling to take the risk of being
sued.125 At the same time, employers face little to no legal consequence for
using overbroad agreements. The majority of courts modify unreasonable
terms, effectively redrafting the agreement to comply with the law. This
incentivizes continued overreaching.126
Whether employers seek more than the law allows is, ultimately, an
empirical question, one that research has begun to address. In turning to that
data, it is useful to distinguish between three forms of overreach, which I
characterize as follows: first, and most blatantly, an employer might act in
direct contravention of a statutory prohibition, by requesting what I refer to
simply as “illegal” noncompetes. Thus, an employer might insist on a
noncompete, despite operating in a nonenforcement jurisdiction, or request
(describing how employers exact noncompetes through “cubewrap contracting practices” that
make the agreement appear to be “simple routine paperwork”); Estlund, supra note 7, at 423
(noting that some employers use noncompetes “as near-boilerplate . . .for a wide variety of
positions, with little regard to the particulars of the position or to whether employees are privy
to protectible information”); Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1129 (concluding that,
while some employers issue unenforceable noncompete covenants by mistake, it is “certain
that invalid [noncompete covenants] continue to be used by those who are well aware that
they are unenforceable as written”); cf. Gentlemen Prefer Bonds, supra note 41, at 667–68
(describing how California employers intentionally undermine the state’s nonenforcement
policy through no poach agreements and other practices).
122
Professor Blake raised this concern eighty years ago. See Blake, supra note 1, at 682
(“For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in
terrorem effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations.”); see also The
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 975–76; Rise of Delayed Term,
supra note 121, at 641; Estlund, supra note 7, at 421; Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at
1134; Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 647–48.
123
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1131–32 (identifying “disconnect” between
law’s purported goal of deterring overreach and “the actions of the courts on the ground” that
are willing to partially enforce overbroad agreements).
124
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1134–36 (“[T]he obvious reason why one party
would seek a [noncompete covenant] clause it knew to be unenforceable is that it believed the
other party to be unaware of the fact and likely to remain unaware of it.”).
125
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1149.
126
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1147.
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one from an employee in a profession where restraints are categorically
void.127 Second, even where noncompetes are statutorily permitted, the
employer might demand one absent any claim to a protectible interest. For
instance, certain employers might request noncompetes as a matter of course
from employees at all levels of its organization, including those who could
not plausibly have access to propriety information or relationships.
Borrowing loosely from the antitrust discourse, I refer to these agreements
as “naked” noncompetes because they serve purely to give the employer a
competitive edge by preventing employee defection.128 Finally, an employer
might overreach in the terms of the agreement itself, what I refer to as
“overbroad” noncompetes. In such a case, the noncompete is justified by the
employee’s access to protectible assets, but the agreement is overly broad in
scope, restricting the employee from working in too wide a market, for too
long a period of time, or in too wide a region.
Recent data support the conclusion that employers in fact engage in at
least some of these forms of overreach. We know, for instance, that
employers use illegal noncompetes in violation of state statutes. The 2014
Noncompete Project found that noncompetes appear with equal frequency
across jurisdictions, despite differences in states’ approaches to
enforceability.129 That is, researchers found no statistical difference in the
number of respondents bound by a noncompete in nonenforcing states
(California and North Dakota) compared to those that allow them.130 Since
employers are presumably aware of the legal regime in which they are
operating, this data raises the concerning possibility that employers in
nonenforcement jurisdictions are capitalizing on employee ignorance to skirt
state law prohibitions.131
127
See, e.g., AZ. REV. STAT. § 23-494 (voiding noncompetes with broadcast employees);
DEL. CODE ANN. § 6-2707 (voiding noncompetes among physicians); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 480-4(d) (West 2015) (voiding noncompetes with technology workers); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 5-37-33. .
128
“Naked” restraints of trade are contracts wherein “the sole object is to restrain trade in
order to avoid the competition which it has always been the policy of the common law to
foster.” United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282–83 (6th Cir 1898), aff’d,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). They are generally void per se or subject to only a truncated inquiry.
See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1904 (distinguishing between “naked” and “ancillary”
restraints of trade and the relevant test for lawfulness).
129
Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, at 370 (finding that the incidence of
noncompetition agreements in particular states bears little relationship to the jurisdiction’s
enforcement rate).
130
In fact, the incidence of noncompetes in non-enforcing states was slightly higher than
their incidence in those jurisdictions deemed most hospitable to enforcement. Prescott,
Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, at 461.
131
To be sure, some of these agreements may be the product of mistake. In the age of
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The same research gives reason to conclude that employers are also
overreaching within enforcing jurisdictions, demanding naked noncompetes
from employees who do not pose a competitive risk. As discussed
previously, the 2014 Noncompete Project revealed that a surprising number
of employees without college degrees have signed noncompetes.132 While
the probability of signing a noncompete increased with income level,
between twelve and twenty-one percent of workers with annual income of
$60,000 and below were likely to have signed as well.133 Moreover, various
sources—including the previously-described investigative work of State
Attorney General offices, isolated industry-specific studies, and a wealth of
court decisions and anecdotal sources—reveal the use of noncompetes across
a range of occupations including sandwich maker, hair stylist, gardener,
daycare worker, and security guard.134
As of yet, we have only caselaw evidence of the third form of
overreach—overbroad agreements whose terms exceed the bounds of the
employer’s protectible interest. What we know empirically about illegal and
naked agreements derives from surveys of labor market participants, which
provide valuable data on the incidence of noncompetes but nothing about
their content. The corpus of cases in which courts modify overbroad
agreements attests the existence of this form of overreach, but research
examining the agreements themselves is needed to verify and understand the
scope of the problem.
Regardless of the type of overreach at issue, data about employee
mobility and noncompete perception support the assumption that such
agreements adversely affect employee behavior. Comparing the mobility
patterns of noncompete signers across jurisdictions with different legal
standard form agreements, less sophisticated employers may simply apply an agreement used
elsewhere in its organization or one obtained commercially without regard to its enforceability
in the relevant jurisdiction or without vetting its suitability to the particular employees asked
to sign. See Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1151 (recognizing the possibility that
unenforceable noncompetes are sometimes the result of honest error). I refer to these
noncompetes as “legacy” agreements because the documents themselves are inherited from
other contexts. Mistake alone, however, likely accounts for only a small subset of
noncompetes found in non-enforcement jurisdictions. Id.
132
See Starr, Prescott & Bishara supra note 102, at 17; supra Part III.A.
133
Starr, Prescott & Bishara, supra note 102, at 42, fig.4.
134
See generally STATE OF ILLINOIS, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, OVERUSE OF
NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS 3 (June 13, 2018), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/fil
es/webpage_materials_papers_madigan_flanagan_june_13_2018.pdf; Steven Greenhouse,
Non-compete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-inarray-of-jobs.html. To be sure, employee skill and pay levels are not perfectly correlated with
access to propriety information or relationships, and it is possible that employers have a
legally cognizable interest with respect to some employees in such positions.
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regimes, the 2014 Noncompete Project found that signers in non-enforcing
jurisdictions had the same increased job tenure and lower defection rates as
signers in enforcing jurisdictions.135 Forty percent of signers across
jurisdictions cited their noncompete as a reason for declining an offer of
employment irrespective of the law in their jurisdiction.136 In addition, fear
of being sued, beliefs about enforceability, and reminders from their
employers were more predictive of whether an employee would decline a
competitor’s offer than the applicable state law.137 Thus the project authors
conclude that “many employees may decide to decline employment offers
they would have otherwise taken simply because they incorrectly believe
their noncompete is enforceable.”138 In short, the in terrorem effects of
noncompete agreements are not hypothetical. Employers are wellpositioned not only to overreach in requesting noncompetes, but to reap
advantages from those terms over the life of the employment relationship,
regardless of their enforceability.139
Finally, there is increasing evidence that employers not only overreach
in the various ways described, but they also manipulate the bargaining
process. In two earlier works, I argued that the contractual view of

135
See Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, The Behavioral Effects of
(Unenforceable) Contracts 16 (Mich. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 16-032, 2019),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858637 [hereinafter The Behavioral Effects of
(Unenforceable) Contracts]
136
Id. at 24.
137
Id. at 25.
138
Id. at 27. In a related information experiment, the authors of the 2014 noncompete
project discovered that subjects greatly over-estimated the enforceability of noncompetes,
including in states where they are completely unenforceable. See J.J. Prescott & Evan Starr,
Subjective Beliefs About the Enforceability of Noncompetes, (Powerpoint Presented June
2019) (on file with Author). These results are unsurprising in light of prior studies
demonstrating that employees misunderstand employer termination rights. See, e.g., Pauline
T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 139 (1997) (finding that 74% of
survey respondents incorrectly believed that employers could not fire an at-will employee for
purely cost-saving reasons); Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them:
Defending Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess
Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 335 (2002) (finding 50%
incorrect response rate in similar study). See Prescott & Starr, supra note 138. Yet employee
misperceptions about employer termination rights and the enforceability of noncompetes
appear to run in opposite directions: employees underestimate the employer’s ability to
terminate employment at will while overestimating the employer’s ability to enforce a
noncompete. For this and other reasons, further study of employee perception is warranted.
139
Indeed, the research reveals a further cause for concern: employers in non-enforcing
jurisdictions in some cases affirmatively “remind” exiting employees of their noncompetes, a
move that may well be calculated to induce compliance with what the employer knows is an
unenforceable agreement. The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts, supra note
135, at 4
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noncompetes as a “bargained-for” term of the employment relationship is
inapplicable in part because employers are likely to delay requesting a
noncompete until after a new employee begins working.140 The significance
of this type of “cubewrap” contracting, as I have referred to it, is that it
undercuts any ability for the employee to reject the noncompete, renegotiate
its terms, or decline the job should the employer prove intransigent and the
noncompete too objectionable.141 Indeed, the 2014 Noncompete Project
revealed that thirty to forty percent of workers are asked to sign noncompetes
after they have accepted work, often when they are already on the job.142 In
other words, even the exceptional employee—the one who knows the law
and has the wherewithal to challenge the employer—is constrained in any
attempt to bargain over the necessity of a noncompete or the breadth of its
terms.
IV. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION LAW
The previous section argued that new empirical research supports the
claims of legal theorists and justifies, if not compels, serious reform. The
next question is whether the new regime will meet the mark: will new
legislation, along with continued regulatory investigation and enforcement,
do the job of reducing the incidence of noncompetes and their collective
effects on markets? Can these efforts successfully police employer behavior,
disincentivizing and remedying employer overreach and manipulative
practices? It is, of course, too soon to answer such questions—the new
regime is only just unfolding. Neither is so broad an assessment possible
within the scope of this Article. Yet to the extent that legislatures or other
regulators are considering options for reform, it is appropriate to offer
preliminary thoughts on the direction of the movement thus far and the
course it ought to follow.
A few disclaimers are in order. First, I will focus on the role of state
legislation targeting the problem of employer overreach. This does not
reflect a preference for keeping the issue of noncompete enforceability

140
See Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 121, at 637; The Dilution of Employee
Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 963.
141
See Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 121, at 653–54 (citing the legion of practical
impediments to an employee negotiating or rejecting a noncompete agreement after accepting
a job offer); The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 966–67
(“[C]ubewrap noncompetes succeed in further diluting an employee’s already tenuous grip
on any form of bargaining power. They strip away the worker’s ability, both at the outset and
during the course of employment, to refuse to deal.”).
142
Starr, Prescott & Bishara, supra note 102, at 46, Table 2; see also Marx, supra note
114 at 706 (finding that 47% of sampled engineers signed their noncompete on or after the
first day of work).
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within the ambit of state regulation; indeed, there may be reasons to prefer a
federal approach.143 As previously noted, however, the likelihood of federal
action appears dim, whereas states have already begun to enact laws and
continue to entertain new bills.144 Second, in considering state legislation, I
will focus on what I consider the critical features of effective “middle way”
statutes. This is where I see both the potential for movement as well as the
need for guidance.145 Finally, I will direct my comments to the particular
problem of employer overreach and resulting in terrorem effects. That is not
to discount the possibility that even reasonably drafted, appropriately
targeted, and fairly obtained noncompetes could, if sufficiently pervasive,
have aggregate market effects justifying further regulation. Rather, I leave
that determination, and the job of striking a suitable balance, to economists
and others with such expertise.
Turning to the task at hand, I believe that states seeking to quash
opportunistic noncompetes of all kinds, and not merely those imposed on
vulnerable populations, must make at least three specific reforms. They must
(1) adopt robust disclosure requirements that go beyond mere notice; (2)
eliminate courts’ ability to modify overbroad agreements; and (3) create a
full-fledged private right of action that grants employees expedited access to
the courts or reviewing agencies. I will discuss each of these briefly.
To begin, reducing in terrorem effects requires reeducation. It is both
common sense and, increasingly, an empirical fact that employees do not
understand their rights or their employers’ when it comes to noncompete
enforcement.146 State legislation that requires advance disclosure of the
agreement does not address this problem, even if the disclosure alerts
employees of their right to seek counsel. Few employees are likely to incur
143
To the extent we conceive of restrictions on employee mobility as an antitrust matter,
it is squarely within federal jurisdiction. See Glick, supra note 1, at 404–417 (applying
antitrust principles). In addition, federal legislation would create welcome uniformity. See
Moffat, supra note 34, at 965. The variation in state laws thus far will doubtlessly pose
enormous compliance challenges for employers. On the single issue of vulnerable worker
status, for instance, no two state laws passed thus far use precisely the same criteria in
establishing the relevant income threshold. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. It is
possible that the desire for consistency and lower compliance costs could incent employers to
support model or uniform state legislation that, while limiting the enforceability of
noncompetes, would achieve greater predictability. The Uniform Law Commission in 2018
appointed a study committee to explore the matter. See https://www.uniformlaws.org/proje
cts/committees/study. As of yet, however, it has issued no proposals.
144
See Part II.B. supra.
145
States will likely continue to enact vulnerable worker bans, a positive development
but one that is necessarily limited and entails relatively few legislative choices beyond setting
the applicable income threshold. See supra Part II.B.1. California-style bans seem a less
realistic prospect and involve even fewer legislative choices. See supra Part II.B.2.
146
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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that expense, particularly at the start of employment when the possibility of
a future separation and the prospect of limited job options are not salient.147
Employees need direct information about the law upon receiving a
noncompete and at any point at which they might contemplate separation; in
other words, throughout their employment. Some proposals thus far have
required employers to post a notice of employee rights, similar to the poster
requirement typical of other protective employment legislation.148 The
continued value of physical posters, however, is questionable in our
increasingly digital age, particularly for workers in technology fields.149 In
addition to a notice posting, state statutes should require employers to
provide an understandable summary of the law and employees’ legal rights
at three points in the relationship: at the time the job offer is made and prior
to the employee accepting, at any point in the relationship when a
noncompete or its renewal is requested of an incumbent employee, and at the
point of termination. The provision of information to incumbent employees
is key to correcting the adverse effects of noncompetes on employee search
behavior.150
147
See The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 981 (describing
cognitive limits on new hires’ ability to evaluate the risk of signing a noncompete at the start
of employment). The likelihood that cognitive bias limits an individual’s ability to
meaningfully assess boilerplate terms has been extensively explored in the consumer context.
See, e.g., Russel Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1203 (2003); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits
of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); James Gibson, Vertical
Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (2013). For this and other reasons, the consensus
among contracts scholars is that mandated disclosure is not a solution to the problem of
adhesive consumer terms. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR, ET AL., MORE THAN YOU WANTED
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (Princeton Univ. Press 2016); NANCY S.
KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 174–210 (2013); MARGARET
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 197–242
(2013). There is reason to hope that advance notice will be more effective in employment
relationships than in the consumer context.See The Rise of Delayed Terms, supra note 121, at
661–62. My contention, however, is that it remains inadequate.
148
See, e.g., Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees Act, S. Res. 1504,
114th Cong. (2015); NY Move Act, Assemb. B. 2504, 142nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2019); S.B. 1387, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019); S.B. 2872, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
149
See, Lobel, Enforceability TBD, supra note 31, at 892-93. This concern is one that
goes well beyond the particular problem of noncompetes. The need to reach employees
through digital channels is one that has been extensively considered in the labor organizing
context. See, e.g., Christine Neylon O’Brien, Employees on Guard: Employer Policies
Restrict NLRA-Protected Concerted Activities on E-mail, 88 OR. L. REV. 195, 198 (2009);
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 WEST VIRGINIA L. REV.
921, 923 (2015). Such matters, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
150 Arguably the point at which this information is most needed is when an employee is
considering whether to search for or accept alternate employment. Since that is not a discrete
point in the relationship, it is impossible to mandate a specifically timed disclosure that will
address that precise concern. The hope rather is that the requirement to re-provide information
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Of course, information campaigns, no matter how effective in
reeducating employees, rely on employees to object to or defend against their
employer’s unlawful contracting practices. That is a risk many, if not most,
might rationally decline to take. To reduce the in terrorem effects of
noncompetes on workers, state legislators must directly target employer
overreach. A simple but effective means of doing so would be to statutorily
overrule the common judicial practice of modifying overbroad noncompetes.
This is hardly a new idea, but it is one that demands recapitulation in light of
the current reform movement.151 Almost every jurisdiction that enforces
noncompetes permits a court to pare down and partially enforce a
noncompete that is otherwise overbroad in scope.152 As a consequence of
this practice, employers have little incentive to draft noncompetes narrowly.
Indeed, they have every reason to overdraft, insofar as they may reap the
benefits of the in terrorem effects of their overbroad terms during the course
of employment. At the same time, the employer has nothing to fear should
the reasonableness of its noncompete ever be challenged: if a court
ultimately concludes that the agreement is overbroad, most likely it will
simply enforce a lesser restraint.153
Despite this, and despite the numerous reform strategies that have
upon a noncompete renewal will partially serve this purpose. Alternatively, legislators could
consider requiring employers to provide the relevant information at regular intervals, such as
in tandem with annual performance reviews or pay increases, irrespective of whether a
renewal is requested.
151
As previously noted, both Professor Sullivan and I pointed out the perverse incentives
created by the judicial modification rule over a decade ago. See The Dilution of Employee
Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 989; Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1220;
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1128–29; see also Estlund, supra note 7, at 422-23.
152
Exceptions include Wisconsin, where modification is statutorily prohibited, see WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (2020); Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 348 N.W.2d 505, 507
(1984), and Virginia and Nebraska, where the question is governed by common law. See,
e.g., Alston Studios, Inc. v. Guess and Assoc., 492 F.2d 279, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1974); Lanmark
Tech., Inc. V. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 531 (E.D. Va. 2006); Gaver v. Schneider’s O.K.
Tire Co., 856 N.W.2d 121 (Neb. 1995) (“[I]t is not the function of courts to reform
unreasonable covenants for the purpose of making them enforceable.”). For decades Georgia
courts adhered to a relatively strict no-modification rule (sometimes referred to as the “red
pencil” rule); however, the state legislature recently adopted a modification rule. GA. CODE
ANN. § 13-8-54(b) (2020).
153
See The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 989 (“[T]he
availability of modification encourages employers to adopt aspirational agreements with the
hopes of obtaining an injunction that reaches to the limits of the law.”); Estlund, supra note
7, at 423 (“[T]he problem of [employer] overreaching . . . is exacerbated by courts’ increasing
willingness to sever or edit offending provisions. . . [F]or the employer who seeks to impose
the widest restrictions possible, why not take a chance and overstep the bounds of the law?”).
In some cases, where it is clear the employer has vastly overreached, a court may decline to
modify. See, e.g., National Graphics Co. v. Dilley, 681 P.2d 546, 547 (Co. App. 1984)
(affirming refusal to modify where noncopete lacked both a duration and geographic scope).
It is unclear, however, how often courts exercise that discretion.
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recently been proposed, there has to date been no movement towards
eliminating judicial modification. To the contrary, at least three recently
adopted state statutes explicitly reaffirm courts’ ability to partially enforce
overbroad restraints.154 This includes Massachusetts’ new noncompete law,
arguably one of the most radically pro-employee overhauls of the new
enforcement regime. Others are silent on the matter, which will allow courts
to continue their pre-reform modification practices. This is deeply
disappointing. It is unclear why judicial modification has been a sleeper
issue in the reform movement, but I strongly suspect it reflects the inevitable
need for legislative compromise. Those advocating for pro-employee
reforms may be ceding this issue in their quest to achieve new substantive
limits on noncompetes and procedural protections for workers. While I
understand the need for compromise, I believe the matter of judicial
modification is too critical to trade.155
Indeed, effective noncompete reform legislation, in addition to
imposing penalties, must establish a comprehensive enforcement system to
police unlawful practices and appropriately compensate aggrieved
employees. Such a system must account for the particular needs and
vulnerabilities of employees at all stages of the employment relationship.
For instance, noncompete legislation should empower and protect employees
who challenge an employer’s use of an unlawful or overbroad agreement at
the point at which it is requested. This can be done by prohibiting retaliation
against employees who question, object to, report, or attempt to negotiate a
proposed agreement.156 On the other hand, once an employee has departed
154
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-53(d) (2020) (“Any restrictive covenant not in
compliance with the provisions of this article is unlawful and is void and unenforceable;
provided, however, that a court may modify a covenant that is otherwise void and
unenforceable so long as the modification does not render the covenant more restrictive with
regard to the employee than is originally drafted by the parties.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.195
(2020) (providing that if an employer brings as action to enforce a noncompetition covenant
that is not in compliance with the statute, “the court shall revise the covenant to the extent
necessary and enforce the covenant as revised”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 149 § 24L
(2020) (“A court may, in its discretion, reform or otherwise revise a noncompetition
agreement so as to render it valid and enforceable to the extent necessary to protect the
applicable legitimate business interest.”).
155
At a minimum, any statute that maintains judicial modification must impose a
monetary penalty on the overreaching employer. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
49.62.080 (West 2020) (“If a court or arbitrator determines that a noncompetition covenant
violates this chapter, the violator must pay the aggrieved person the greater of his or her actual
damages or a statutory penalty of five thousand dollars, plus reasonably attorneys’ fees,
expenses, and costs incurred in the proceeding.”). Such a statute deters over-drafting through
the threat of liability while still preserving the court’s authority to modify overbroad
agreements.
156
For instance, legislation recently considered in New Jersey would have prohibited an
employer from “penaliz[ing] an employee for defending against or challenging the validity or
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or is on the brink of defection, that employee requires access to a forum that
will swiftly adjudicate the lawfulness of his or her agreement.157 Departing
employees likely also need a mechanism for redressing losses resulting from
the imposition or attempted enforcement of an unlawful or overbroad
agreement. This can be achieved through the creation of a private right of
action that grants employees the right to equitable relief, actual or liquidated
damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.158 Finally, the law must create pathways
for incumbent employees to vet their agreements ex ante. To be sure, some
will and should seek legal counsel before undertaking a job search. It would
be appropriate, however, for new legislation to entrust to a state agency the
power to investigate noncompetes, respond to individual complaints, and
even issue opinion letters to concerned employees.159
enforceability of the covenant.” S.B. 2872, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018). Absent such
a provision, at-will employees are vulnerable to adverse action should they object to an invalid
agreement. In theory, the common law public policy tort or state whistleblower laws could
provide a vehicle for relief, but results in such cases have been inconsistent outside of
California. See, e.g., Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 846 A.2d 604, 609 (N.J.
2004) (holding that employee’s refusal to sign non-compete after three and a half years of
employment was a “private dispute” over contract terms not covered by New Jersey’s
Conscientious Employee Protection Act); Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217,
222 (Wis. 1998) (holding that termination of an at-will employee for refusal to sign
noncompete agreement did not give rise to wrongful discharge claim in violation of public
policy exception). This owes in part to the reality that in an at-will employment regime,
employers are free to fire or refuse to hire a worker who is unwilling to agree to the employer’s
proposed terms, provided they are lawful. Noncompete reform legislation that limits the
situations in which noncompetes can be used must simultaneously protect any employee who
objects to an invalid agreement.
157
Some proposals have located authority to oversee enforcement and compliance in a
government agency. See, e.g., “MOVE” Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015) (granting
U.S.Secretary of Labor authority to “receive, investigate, attempt to resolve, and enforce a
complaint of violation”); NY Move Act, Assemb. B. 2504, 142nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2019) (granting state labor commissioner “power to receive, investigate, attempt to resolve,
and enforce a complaint of a violation); H.B. 563, 2019 Leg., 203rd Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2019)
(granting state labor department authority to enforce law and “conduct investigations as it
deems necessary”). While I believe agencies can play an important role in the new
enforcement regime, their authority must not limit departing employees’ access to an
immediate judicial review in the face of threatened enforcement. Indeed, it would be
appropriate for legislation to establish an expedited pathway for employees seeking a
declaratory judgment.
158
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.62.080 (2020); S.B. 2872, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess.
(N.J. 2018).
159
For instance, employers can seek the advice of the Department of Labor regarding
certain compliance issues under federal employment laws, such as whether employees are
properly classified as exempt from minimum wage and overtime under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The opinion letters issued by the Department can serve as the basis for a good
faith defense to liability or liquidated damages in the event of future claims. See 29 U.S.C. §
259 (2020). One could imagine a similar scheme enacted through noncompete reform
legislation that would allow an employee to obtain a determination as to the enforceability of
his or her noncompete prior to accepting alternate employment.
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To be sure, no legislative scheme will be perfect. It would be a loss,
however, if the current reform movement were to result in legislation that
recreates the status quo or, worse, further muddies existing law. Such is my
fear with Massachusetts’ recent legislation that not only affirms the judicial
modification rule, but introduces new areas of legal uncertainty while
granting employees no vehicle for review or redress. Whatever substantive
limitations or procedural protections new laws might impose, they will be of
little use if employers remain free to demand overly broad noncompetes and
credibly threaten litigation without fear of penalty or repercussion. The
political will necessary for meaningful reform is here; let it not be
squandered.
V. CONCLUSION
Three hundred years after the seminal court decision sanctioning
reasonable noncompetes, change is in the making. Policy makers at all levels
of government are considering reform initiatives that range from protections
for vulnerable workers, to multifaceted overhauls of state law, to the outright
elimination of all forms of employee noncompetes. This new enforcement
regime is being fueled in no small part by the recent wave of empirical
research bringing to light the aggregate and individual effects of noncompete
use. That work, in turn, owes a debt to the foundational theoretical work
contributed by Professor Sullivan and other legal scholars reaching back
over decades. The confluence of these branches of academic scholarship
with real-time reform activity on the ground make this a critical moment for
noncompete policy. It is one that cannot be wasted. A regime that wishes
to succeed both in freeing workers from oppressive restraints and capturing
the economic benefits associated with greater employee mobility must do
more than merely outlaw a subclass of vulnerable worker restraints that, in
most cases, are already void under existing law. Employers are in a position
to overreach relative to what state law permits, a reality with severe
implications for all employees who sign. Bolder statutory limitations and
procedural requirements must be devised, attentive to the real conditions
under which employees agree to and abide by these ancient but ubiquitous
agreements.

